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HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICT: THE THIRD DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE
CHARLES L. CANTRELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Two chapters of important statutory revisions were just
completed in the continuing development of a body of humani-
tarian law governing conduct during warfare. The conclusion
of the Third and Fourth Diplomatic Conferences of the Reaffir-
mation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts marked the formal ending of a
lengthy process initiated by the International Committee of the
Red Cross to update the 1949 Geneva Conventions and inte-
grate the principles and concepts of humanitarian law through-
out the Conventions.
This article will deal with the developments which occurred
at the Third Diplomatic Conference. All major articles adopted
by the various working committees of the Conference have been
included herein. Due to the obvious limitations of space and
time, an extensive analysis of the adopted articles is not at-
tempted. Rather, it is hoped that this article will provide the
reader with a broad overview of the present state of the law in
this area, and in particular, an appreciation of the many ac-
complishments of the third session of the Conference.
The article begins with a short section detailing the evolve-
ment and growth of humanitarian law in armed conflicts. Fol-
lowing this is a discussion of the Third Conference's accom-
plishments with regard to Protocols I and H. The examination
of Protocol I, which involves noninternational armed conflicts,
is separated into two different sections for .clarification pur-
poses. Within these two sections, various articles of the Proto-
cols are grouped together in an attempt to summarize the im-
portant results in various areas of concern.
II. THE EVOLVEMENT OF HUMANITARIAN LAW
The development and application of humanitarian law in
* J.D. 1972, Baylor University; LL.M. 1976, University of Texas; Assistant Profes-
sor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
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the area of armed conflicts is a relatively modern phenomenon
which has been precipitated by substantial changes in battle-
field weapons, strategies and combatants.' Until the first Ge-
neva Convention was promulgated in 1864,2 the protection of
war victims depended upon the existence of bilateral agree-
ments entered into by belligerent commanders and upon the
application of any customary international law which had de-
veloped through the practice of states .3
The Geneva Convention of 1864 was a significant achieve-
ment in the advancement of international humanitarian law.
Its acceptance by the world's major powers marked the initial
entry of law into the sphere of international armed conflicts.4
Perhaps more importantly, it set forth certain rules of conduct
which were proscribed by internationally recognized moral
principles. However crude and incomplete were its provisions,
the importance and sanctity of the individual were acknowl-
edged for the first time in international law.
Soon after the landmark Convention of 1864, two parallel
developments occurred which signaled the beginning of an in-
ternational movement to refine the 1864 principles and apply
1. For discussions pertaining to the protection of civilians, avoidance of nonmili-
tary targets and the use of controversial weapon systems, see LAW AND RESPONSIBILITY
IN WARFARE: THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE (P. Trooboff ed. 1975); LEVIE, SOME MAJOR
INADEQUACIES IN THE EXISTING LAW RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS DURING
ARMED CONFLICT (Working paper of the Fourteenth Hammarskjold Forum), reprinted
in WHEN BATTLE RAGES, How CAN LAW PROTECT? 1 (J. Carey ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as LEvIE]; T. WULFF, CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, THEIR DEPLOYMENT AND EFFECTS
FROM A HUMANITARIAN ASPECT; RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (M. Nygren trans. 1973) [hereinafter cited as T. WULFF].
2. Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, con-
cluded Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, T.S. No. 377. This treaty was composed of only
ten brief articles, but successfully provided for the protection of wounded and sick
members of the armed forces and the immunity of ambulances, military hospitals and
medical personnel from hostile acts.
3. J. PiCTET, GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE
WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 10 (1952) [hereinafter cited as J.
PICTET].
4. Id. at 11. This was the first treaty codification of certain principles of conduct
designed for the protection of the individual victims of war. It is generally considered
that this treaty was the beginning of the formal evolutionary process of customary
humanitarian law initiated in the seventeenth century by the scholar Grotius. H.
GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 366 (A. Campbell trans. 1901). The acceptance
of the rudimentary Grotian principles of minimum destruction and protection of non-
combatants as elements of the early customary international law of war has been
commented upon in the following works: J. BOND, THE RULES OF RIOT 15-19 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as J. BOND]; J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
13-18 (1973) [hereinafter cited as J. STONE].
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humanitarian law to the methods and means of conducting
hostilities. The St. Petersburg Declaration5 expressed the prin-
ciple that a proportionality test should exist which would bal-
ance the necessary military advantage sought with the result-
ing destruction done. In addition, it ambitiously forbade the
use of a small exploding bullet which had recently been devel-
oped.6 This individual-directed proportionality principle was
aimed at disabling the greatest possible number of combatants
without uselessly aggravating their suffering or rendering their
deaths inevitable. 7 However, it is apparent that the abundance
and use of antipersonnel weapons in modern arsenals indicate
a consistent state practice that has disregarded this doctrine
and has consequently prevented it from becoming part of the
customary international law of war.'
The second notable event in 1868 was the convening of a
diplomatic conference to revise the 1864 Convention and ex-
pand its principles to cover naval warfare.9 Although the draft
convention of 1868 was never ratified, abundant evidence exists
that its principles were followed by some major powers in two
wars occurring before the turn of the century."
A subsequent attempt to codify the law of war on land was
made in 1874 in Brussels.1 The Brussels Convention was the
first international agreement which sought to regulate the
treatment of prisoners of war. 2 Although the Convention was
never ratified, it served as an important model for subsequent
international agreements which were patterned after its princi-
5. The Declaraion of St. Petersburg, Dec. 11, 1868, reproduced in I THE LAW OF WAR
192-93 (L. Friedman ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as I THE LAW OF WAR].
6. "The contracting parties engage,. . . to renounce, in case of war among them-
selves, the employment, . . . of any projectile of less weight than four hundred
grammes, which is explosive, or is charged with fulminating or inflammable sub-
stances." Id. at 192.
7. Id. at 192-93.
8. Baxter, Comments, in LAw AND RFsPoNsmlLrrY IN WARFARE, supra note 1, at 65.
But see Harris, Modern Weapons and the Law of Land Warfare, 12 Mu.. L. WAR REv.
7, 14 (1973). Selected sources which deal with the destructive capabilities of modem
weapons are as follows: LEVIE, supra note 1, at 20; Paust, Weapons Regulation, Mili-
tary Necessity and Legal Standards: Are Contemporary Department of Defense
"Practices" Inconsistent with Legal Norms?, 4 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 229 (1974); T.
WULFF, supra note 1.
9. J. Picwrr, supra note 3, at 15.
10. Note, 47 INT'L L. DOCUMENTS 1950-51, at 2 (1952).
11. Declaration of Brussels, Aug. 27, 1874, reproduced in I THE LAW OF WAR, supra
note 5, at 194-203.
12. Id. arts. XXIII-XXXIII, at 198-200.
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pal articles."
The most important development that served to circum-
scribe the methods and means of conducting warfare was the
Hague Convention of 1899,'1 which was later revised into a
comprehensive treaty and annex of regulations that were fi-
nally published in 1907.'1 The Hague Convention of 1907 has
continued to serve as the basic fabric of international law gov-
erning the conduct of hostilities until the present time.
An appreciation of the desire to modernize and supplement
the Hague Convention was first ev/denced shortly after World
War I. At that time nations realized that aerial warfare had
been omitted from coverage under existing international law.
This concern ultimately resulted in the drafting of the Hague
Rules of Air Warfare.16 These rules have never been adopted,
and the state practice in the last forty years clearly shows that
very few customary rules of aerial warfare have emerged. 7
The use of chemical and biological weapons in international
conflict has largely been proscribed since the termination of
World War I. It is altogether uncertain whether the true reason
is the observance of a customary rule of international law or a
fear that a reprisal in-kind would be too devastating on the
attacker. The answer depends on whether the Geneva Gas Pro-
tocol of 1925' 8 has assumed the status of a rule of customary
13. J. STONE, supra note 4, at 547. In addition to codifying certain principles deal-
ing with the treatment of prisoners of war, the Brussels Convention dealt with occupa-
tions by belligerent forces. I THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 5, arts. I-VIII, at 194-95;
definitions of armed forces, id. arts. IX-XI, at 196; humanitarian restraints on combat
methods, id. arts. XII-XIV, at 196-97; restraints on attacking civilian towns, id. arts.
XV-XVIII, at 197; and treatment of spies, id. arts. XIX-XXII, at 197-98.
14. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403.
15. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
Annex, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter cited as the Fourth Hague Convention
of 1907].
16. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, Feb. 20, 1923, reproduced in I THE LAW OF WAR,
supra note 5, at 437-49.
17. Professor Levie persuasively argues that Article 25 of the Regulations attached
to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 prohibits certain aerial bombardment inas-
much as it forbids "attack of bombardment by whatever means" on undefended tar-
gets. LEvIE, supra note 1, at 21-29. While the travaux preparatoires indicated that this
provision applied to aerial warfare, Professor Julius Stone considered that the restric-
tion applied only when the attacker was in the combat zone and in a position to capture
the target. J. STONE, supra note 4, at 621.
18. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S.
65.
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international law. Although there are views to the contrary, 9
the Protocol does not bind nonsignatories and has not attained
the necessary voluntary observance to be classified as a part of
customary international law.2 1
III. THE MODERN GENEVA CONVENTIONS
In 1929 the world's major powers sought to reform and ex-
tend the principles of the 1906 Geneva Conventions. 2' Having
witnessed the inadequacies of the 1906 Convention regarding
the rights of medical personnel and the legal duties of the bel-
ligerents to observe these rights, the 1929 participants promul-
gated two expanded and modernized treaties on humanitarian
law in armed conflicts. 22 These treaties served as the founda-
tion of humanitarian law applicable in international warfare
until the end of World War II.
The Nazi atrocities combined with the spector of atomic
warfare served as the important impetuses in the movement to
revise the 1929 Geneva Conventions. In a short three years an
extensive program of development successfully culminated in
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.23
19. Professor Baxter states that lethal gases are banned by customary international
law. Baxter & Buergenthal, Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 853, 853 (1970). Whether nonlethal agents are similarly banned by customary
law is doubtful, but there seems to be a distinct trend to proscribe them. See J. BOND,
supra note 4, at 94-95; XXth International Conference of the Red Cross, Vienna, Oct.
1965, Resolutions 28; XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross, Istanbul, Sept.
1969, Resolutions 14.
20. Lethal gases and agents could be subject to a customary rule banning a first
strike, but numerous reservations have been taken to the 1925 Protocol and allow a
reprisal through the use of these lethal agents. While an otherwise illegal act may be
justified if made properly through a reprisal, the concomitant requirement of propor-
tionality exposes the difficulty of legal analysis in this area. Taking into account the
large number of nonsigning nations and existing chemical agent stockpiles, valid suspi-
cions remain whether this Protocol has assumed the status of a customary rule. For
two excellent analyses see Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the
United States Agree?, 1969 Wis. L. Rav. 375; J. STONE, supra note 4, at 553-57.
21. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies
in the Field, July 6, 1906, 35 Stat. 1885, T.S. No. 464.
22. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of
Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, T.S. No. 847, 118 L.N.T.S. 303;
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021,
T.S. No. 846, 118 L.N.T.S. 343.
23. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 (proclaimed Aug. 30, 1955) [hereinafter cited as First Geneva Conven-
tion]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick,
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
19771
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In addition to being a detailed elaboration of the rights and
duties of the belligerents in time of war, the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 served to close many loopholes in humanitarian
law which had allowed some nations to completely disregard
the prior conventions. Application of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions was extended to three situations where the prior law was
silent: an undeclared state of war, partial occupation of terri-
tory without armed resistance, and a nonsigning state which
voluntarily bound itself to the Conventions.24
The universal acceptance of these Conventions has been the
single most important step in developing a core of substantive
humanitarian law that would be accepted and applied by the
majority of nations. Whether these Conventions would have
met the test of a third international conflict is not known. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), however,
recognized several of the Conventions' shortcomings in this
changing age of warfare. Consequently, the ICRC began to pre-
pare necessary revisions as early as 1953.5
In 1969, the International Red Cross Conference unani-
mously adopted a resolution which proposed that the ICRC
draft a set of rules supplementing the existing 1949 Conven-
tions. Pursuant to this resolution the ICRC convened two con-
ferences of government experts in 1971 and 1972.25 Prior to
each of these conferences the ICRC met with its own panel of
experts in an attempt to correct any major objections or errors
in the draft rules. The result of these meetings was two draft
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (proclaimed Aug. 30, 1955) [hereinafter cited as
Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (pro-
claimed Aug. 30, 1955) [hereinafter cited as Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (proclaimed Aug. 30, 1955)
[hereinafter cited as Fourth Geneva Convention].
24. See Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, supra note 23.
25. Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Popula-
tion in Time of War. The ICRC completed these provisions but was unable to gain wide
acceptance of the Rules. See XXth International Conference of the Red Cross, Vienna,
Oct. 1965, Resolutions 21.
26. For details of these conferences, see generally Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The
Conference of Government Experts, 24 May-12 June, 1971, 2 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 68
(1971); Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The Conference of Government Experts (Second
Session), 3 May-2 June, 1972, 3 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 18 (1972).
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protocols to the Geneva Conventions 7 first published by the
ICRC in 1973.
The ICRC prepared these draft protocols to cover two dif-
ferent types of armed conflicts. Protocol I applies only in the
case of international armed conflicts, while Protocol II applies
to noninternational armed conflicts or civil wars. A separate
protocol was required for noninternational armed conflicts be-
cause of a wide disagreement as to what level of insurgency
would be required to bring those international humanitarian
obligations into force.28
Soon after the two draft protocols and Commentary were
published in 1973, the ICRC held the First Diplomatic Confer-
ence in February 1974. That Conference was plagued by politi-
cal issues running the gamut from the definition of "unjust"
wars to the proper classification of wars of national liberation.
Predictably, the Conference accomplished little in the way of
adopting important provisions of the draft rules.21
The Second Diplomatic Conference was held in February
1975, and was considered to be much more successful than the
prior one. At the conclusion of this Conference, it was sus-
pected that many agreements were reached with the expecta-
27. These draft rules are explained in Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949; Commentary (ICRC 1973) [hereinafter cited as Com-
mentary]. See also Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Draft
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 (Comit6 Interna-
tional de ]a Croix-Rouge D 1395 b, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Draft Protocol I];
Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, Draft Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 (Comit6 International de la Croix-Rouge
D 1388/1 b, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Draft Protocol II].
28. This dispute over the definition of what constitutes an "armed conflict not of
an international character" can be traced back to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. J.
PREUX, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 27-37
(J. Pictet ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as J. PREUx]. See generally Farer, Humanitarian
Law and Armed Conflicts: Toward the Definition of "International Armed Conflict,"
71 COLUM. L. REV. 37 (1971).
29. For various views of the Conference's proceedings see Baxter, Humanitarian
Law or Humanitarian Politics?-The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian
Law, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1975); Graham, The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the
Law of War: A Victory for Political Causes and a Return to the "Just War" Concept
of Eleventh Century, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 25 (1975); Bond, Amended Article I of
Draft Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions: The Coming of Age of the Guerilla,
32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 65 (1975); Forsythe, The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on
Humanitarian Law: Some Observations, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1975); Kalshoven,
Reaffirmation and Development of International Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts:
The First Session of the Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 20 February-29 March, 1974,
5 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1974).
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tion that Protocol II would never come into force. This situa-
tion arose because Protocol II was amended to apply to those
armed conflicts not within the purview of Protocol I and to
exclude all "disturbances and tensions such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature"
that do not constitute armed conflicts." In order for Protocol
II to come into force in the case of insurgency, additional re-
quirements must be met which will, in all probability, preclude
its application in the vast majority of internal conflicts."
In summary, it appears that compromise was achieved in
troublesome areas only at the expense of Protocol II having a
wide scope of application. It would have been too optimistic,
perhaps, to expect many of the unstable third world nations to
guarantee humane treatment to insurgents, but this problem
has nevertheless cast a pale over the entire effort.2
IV. THE THIRD DIPLOMATIC SESSION
The third session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaf-
firmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts met in Geneva from April
21 to June 11, 1976. The adoption of forty-two articles in both
protocols indicated a high degree of consensus. The remainder
of this article is a summary of the accomplishments of these
protocols and an attempt to offer some insight into the prob-
lems remaining to be solved at the fourth session.
A. Protocol I - International Armed Conflicts
Combat Restrictions
Issues of vital importance concerning the definitions of
"combatants" and "armed forces" were resolved with the
30. Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Second Session, Committee I,
Draft Report, CDDHII/284, Apr. 12, 1975, at 20.
31. Id. The additional requirements are set forth in Article 1 of Protocol II and are
as follows: (a) the rebels must constitute a dissident armed force or be comprised of
organized armed groups, (b) have a responsible command, (c) exercise such control
over the territory of the state as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
military actions, and (d) be able to implement the provisions of Protocol II.
32. The Second Diplomatic Conference has been reviewed in the following works:
Cantrell, Civilian Protection in Internal Armed Conflicts: The Second Diplomatic
Conference, 11 TEx. INT'L L.J. 305 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Cantrell]; Solf &
Grandison, International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, 10 J. INT'L
L. & EcoN. 567 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Solf & Grandison]; Suckow, Conference
on Humanitarian Law - Phase II, 14 R~v. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 42 (1975).
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adoption of Article 41.11 This article will bring various groups
such as mercenaries, guerillas and liberation soldiers under the
provisions of the Protocol. In past wars, parties would some-
times deny responsibility for the actions of certain nonregular
forces on the basis that only regular forces were under the re-
strictions of the Geneva Conventions. This article can be
viewed as an attempt to make all individual participants in a
conflict come under applicable international law regardless of
their organization.
The provisions of Protocol I provide that all members of
armed forces, except medical personnel and chaplains, are to
be considered as combatants. Therefore, all personnel partici-
pating directly in the conflict will be accorded all appropriate
privileges. It is further provided that if a party incorporates a
paramilitary or law enforcement agency into its armed forces,
a duty arises to notify the other parties of the incorporation.
A definition of "armed forces" is also provided in this arti-
cle; it includes all groups and units which are under a com-
mand responsible to a particular party for the conduct of its
subordinates. It is further required that all of these groups have
an internal disciplinary system which enforces the rules of war-
fare.
Another major problem identified by the ICRC was the use
of "perfidy" in armed conflicts. Perfidy is defined in Article 35
as "[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary that he is
entitled to, or is obliged to accord protection under interna-
tional law applicable in armed conflicts with intent to betray
that confidence. '34 In other words, these are acts which falsely
create a situation where the adversary feels obliged by applica-
ble international law to abstain from any hostile acts. Four
examples are specifically prohibited by the article: feigning of
an intent to surrender or negotiate under a flag of truce; feign-
ing incapacitation by wounds or sickness; feigning of civilian,
noncombatant status; feigning of protected status by the use
of neutral or United Nations signs, emblems or uniforms.
Two important qualifications exist with respect to perfidy.
First, perfidy is not prohibited per se, but only when it is used
to "kill, injure, or capture an adversary."3 5 Secondly, the act
33. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, at 35.
34. Id. at 32.
35. Id.
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must be performed with the "intent" to betray the confidence
created. Therefore, feigning surrender in order to escape would
not violate the article where it was not done to kill, injure or
capture the adversary.
Ruses of war are specifically exempt from the prohibition of
this article. These are acts performed to induce the enemy to
act recklessly or to mislead him. However, they must not vio-
late any rule of international law nor deceive the enemy into
believing that the actor is protected under law. Examples of
these permissible tactics are the uses of camouflage, traps,
mock operations and misinformation.
The concept of "quarter" or abstaining from the practice of
killing all of the survivors of a military attack was first codified
in the law of war in 1907.36 However, the ICRC was generally
unsatisfied with the cursory protection afforded by the 1907
rule and proceeded to slightly expand its premise. The new rule
which is embodied in Article 38 is as follows: "It is forbidden
to order that there shall be no survivors, to threaten an adver-
sary therewith, or to conduct hostilities on this basis. ' 37 This
definition of "quarter" has two distinct advantages over the
prior one. First, it prohibits the threat of conducting hostilities
without quarter. Secondly, it clarifies the ambiguous Hague
definition, and attempts to eliminate the possibilities of an
adversary claiming an excused violation under either ignorance
of the law or under circumstances which were claimed to be
exigent.
In conjunction with the expanded concept of quarter, the
ICRC also sought to increase the protection given to those com-
batants who are hors de combat. A person is deemed to be hors
de combat if he is within the power of an adverse party or
clearly expresses an intention to surrender. If a person has.been
rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds
or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself, he
is also considered to be hors de combat. Finally, in any case
where a person abstains from hostile acts and does not attempt
to escape, he is also considered to be hors de combat. 8
These provisions significantly expand the protection over
the 1907 Hague Convention which protected only those who
36. Article 23(d) of the Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, supra note
15, states: "it is especially forbidden [t]o declare that no quarter will be given. . ....
37. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, at 33.
38. Id. art. 38 bis, at 33.
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laid down their arms, or surrendered when there was no longer
a means of defense. 9 The overriding purpose is to prohibit the
enemy rendered hors de combat from becoming the "object" of
attack. Therefore, the article does not cover those cases where
the protected status is violated when the object of attack is
something else."0
Another portion of Article 38 bis" provides for the safe re-
lease of persons entitled to prisoner of war status where they
are captured under "unusual conditions of combat," and can-
not be evacuated under the provisions of the Third Geneva
Convention. 2 This rule will have a substantial impact in the
areas of guerrilla warfare and wars of national liberation. By
definition, the operations of small and clandestine guerrilla
units would qualify under the "unusual conditions" language.
These types of forces have neither the procedure nor the incli-
nation to safely evacuate prisoners pursuant to the Third Ge-
neva Convention. Therefore, the restrictions contained in this
article along with the prohibition against conducting hostilities
without quarter, combine to serve as a strong restraint on the
conduct of these operations.
Aircraft occupants who because of distress must parachute
from their airplanes are extended a moderate amount of protec-
tion. There is a general prohibition against making them the
object of an attack while descending unless they will land in
territory under the control of their state or one of her allies.43
In addition to the flat prohibition against firing at parachuting
aircraft occupants when landing in enemy territory, a supple-
mentary rule requires that they be given an opportunity to
surrender when they land." The only two exceptions to these
rules are: (a) airborne troops who are not covered under the
rules;4" and (b) the opportunity to surrender need not be ex-
tended to those occupants who have landed and are "engaging
39. Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 15, art. 23(c).
40. Thus, no special protection is given to those wounded or hors de combat while
they remain commingled with the combatants. As a necessary concomitant, the segre-
gation of those incapacitated and a resultant accidental injury to them is an unpro-
tected occurrence under this article.
41. See note 38 supra.
42. For an analysis of these provisions of the Third Geneva Convention see J.
PREUX, supra note 28, at 171-75.
43. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 39(1), at 34.
44. Id. art. 39(2).
45. Id. art. 39(3).
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in a hostile act." 46
Airborne troops had not previously been entitled to protec-
tion while descending, and the Conference refused to extend
the necessary protection to those occupants parachuting to
safety over territory under their state's control. This unadopted
broad principle of protection, however, is currently afforded by
the armed forces of the United States," but the prevailing atti-
tude at the Conference was that these highly trained individu-
als would only join their forces again to make subsequent at-
tacks upon their adversaries. 8 Here, again, the practical as-
pects of waging war took priority over humanitarian considera-
tions.
The subject of espionage is covered by Article 40.14 The final
rules that were adopted comprise a four-part article that adds
little to the existing international law as defined under the 1907
Hague Convention." In addition to reaffirming the well known
principle that a member of the armed forces shall not be con-
sidered a spy if he is wearing a uniform while engaging in his
clandestine activities, special protection is afforded to resi-
dents of an occupied territory. A member of the armed forces
who gathers information for his side and who is also a resident
of the territory occupied by an adverse party shall not be con-
sidered a spy unless he performs certain acts under "false pre-
tenses" or "deliberately in a clandestine manner." 5'
With the adoption of these articles that limit combat meth-
ods and more carefully define the parameters of humanitarian
law, the Committee completed its work in these areas. The only
article which may be reconsidered is Article 39 which grants
46. Id. art. 39(2). It should be noted that the American delegation argued for the
proposition that all airmen descending by parachute from an aircraft in distress should
be considered temporarily hors de combat and entitled to protection. The United
States has further announced that it will support the reconsideration of this issue at
the Fourth Session in expectation that the protection will be accorded to all regardless
of where they will land. See Report of the United States Delegation to the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Third Session 14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Report of the United States Delegation].
47. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAw OF LAND WARFARE, ch.
30 (1956).
48. Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 46, at 14.
49. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, at 34.
50. Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 15, arts. 29-31.
51. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 40(3), at 34. An additional restriction is
that the resident spy will lose his preferred status as a prisoner of war only if he is
captured while he is engaging in espionage.
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only a limited protection to aircraft occupants parachuting to
safety in friendly territory.5 2
Prisoners of War
At the conclusion of the Third Session of the Diplomatic
Conference the issue of whether members of resistance move-
ments and liberation fronts would be entitled to prisoner of war
status remained unresolved. There seems to be a difficulty in
developing a single standard for regular forces and guerrilla
fighters that does not encourage uniformed soldiers to dress in
civilian clothes.53 The possibility of such encouragement ex-
posed the fundamental problem of distinguishing civilians
from civilian-clothed combatants. A preliminary working
group study recommended that a person retain his combatant
status when he cannot "distinguish himself and retain a chance
of success so long" as "he carries his arms openly during each
military engagement, and during such time as he is visible to
the adversary."54 This proposal of the working group will be the
basis for the reconsideration of the issue at the fourth session.
Another closely related problem also left unresolved at the
close of the third session was the status of mercenaries. The
Nigerian delegation submitted a proposal that would deny
prisoner of war status to mercenaries. 5 "Mercenary" was de-
fined as one "not a member of the armed forces of a Party to
the conflict who is specially recruited abroad and . . moti-
vated . . . essentially for monetary payment, reward, or other
private gain. '56
While no final draft article was approved, several problem
areas were identified. Among the more important was whether
"instructors" should be included in this category, or whether
the term "mercenaries" should only apply to those engaged in
actual fighting.5 7 Other important questions arose regarding
the quantum of proof necessary to demonstrate a person's mo-
tivation for private gain and the definition of "essentially for
. ..private gain."58 Perhaps the most formidable theoretical
52. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
53. Draft Report Addendum, Committee Hm, CCDH/nh/361/add. 2, at 1 (1976).
54. Id. at 2-3.
55. Draft Report Addendum, Committee I, CDDH]I1]361/add. 1, at 1 (1976).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id.
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dispute is whether a party to the conflict may grant nationality
status or military rank to mercenaries and thereby bypass the
loss of prisoner of war status provisons.
In the midst of all of this disagreement over the questions
of guerrilla fighters and mercenaries, the Conference surpris-
ingly managed to approve Article 42 bis.59 These provisions
create a presumption in favor of a captured combatant by stat-
ing that he shall be entitled to prisoner of war status if he
claims such status, appears entitled to it, or if the party on
which he depends claims such status on his behalf."0 This pre-
sumption continues until a competent tribunal finally deter-
mines his true status." If such person does not qualify as a
prisoner of war, he will nevertheless be entitled to numerous
fundamental guarantees which include protection from physi-
cal violence and moral coercion. 2
Article 42 bis was the sole article regarding prisoners of war
that was adopted at the session. However, there appears to be
a sufficient consensus of opinion that the major areas of dispute
are settled. Only the technical definition of "mercenary" and
certain minor issues remain to be solved. It is expected that the
prisoner of war provisions will be substantially completed by
the close of the fourth session.
Medical Transportation
The finishing touches were put on the broad plan of protec-
tion given to medical transports under Protocol I with the
adoption of Article 24.63 These rules extend the protective cov-
erage given to mobile medical units to medical ships and craft
not specifically included under the Protocol or Geneva Conven-
tions. There exists a requirement that the craft be identifiable
by any party. 4 Therefore, any craft claiming protection under
59. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, at 36.
60. Id.
61. "Competent tribunal" does not mean "military tribunal." This interpretation
was expressly rejected in the Third Geneva Convention. Competent tribunal therefore
means any appropriate judicial or administrative court or tribunal. See J. PREUX,
supra note 28, at 77; Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 46, at 15.
62. Paragraph 3 of Article 42 bis guarantees protection to all those not entitled to
prisoner of war status under Article 65. This latter article remains unadopted, but will,
in all probability, be adopted at the Fourth Session. For a complete list of the safe-
guards of Article 65, see Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, at 54.
63. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, at 23.
64. Id.
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this provision must be marked in a manner consistent to the
general rules of the Geneva Conventions. 5 The overriding prin-
ciple of the entire article is to protect those ships and craft
temporarily pressed into emergency service.
The prospect of allowing medical flights to pass over the
territory of an adverse party during a conflict raises a very real
danger to ground personnel. Any such medical flight could be
equipped to transmit vital intelligence data or even execute an
attack. Simply stated, the problem was to provide sufficient
protection for these flights while securing adequate safeguards
for the opposing ground forces. Article 31 addresses this issue
and provides that when medical aircraft fly over land or water
either under the control of an adverse party or under no party's
control, the aircraft may be ordered to land for inspection.6
If the aircraft lands on the ground, a full inspection is pre-
sumably allowed. If the landing is on water an expeditious
inspection must be undertaken.67 If the aircraft is found to be
in violation of any restrictions, it may be seized by the adverse
party. 68
Medical aircraft, in lieu of an agreement, are forbidden by
Article 32 to fly over the territory of a neutral state or over a
state that is not a party to the conflict. 9 In the event of a
navigational error or an emergency, the aircraft must identify
itself and comply with any forthcoming orders to land for
inspection. 0 There is a duty on the part of the territorial state
to apply their restrictions in an equal manner to all parties to
the conflict. 71 In the event of a discovered violation, a duty
exists to detain the occupants consistent with a strict doctrine
of neutrality.7 2
65. See The Second Geneva Convention, supra note 23, art. 42-43.
66. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, at 28.
67. Id. art. 31(2). In this regard, recourse should be made to Article 29 which
forbids the use of medical aircraft to gain military advantage, transmit intelligence
data, possess a large degree of armament, or search for the wounded, sick and the
shipwrecked. Id. at 26-27.
68. Id. art. 31(4), at 28. The subsequent use of the seized aircraft is limited to
medical purposes for all aircraft which are designated "permanent" medical aircraft.
These are defined as "those which are assigned for an indeterminate period to medical
transportation." Id. art. 21(b), at 22.
69. Id. art. 32, at 29.
70. Id. art. 32(2).
71. Id. art. 32(5), at 30.
72. Id. art. 32(4), at 29-30.
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Technical Annex
The basis of a technical and comprehensive foundation of
rules regarding the identification and recognition of medical
and civil defense personnel was established by the approval of
fourteen articles of the Technical Annex." The Annex proposes
a broad scheme of increased communication and signal meth-
ods in order to update the present visual recognition method.
This project was deemed to be an absolute necessity because
the sophistication of modern weaponry often precludes visual
sighting in advance of attack.
The most important parts of the Technical Annex are con-
tained in Chapter III and set forth the various distinctive sig-
nals that will become available.74 The use of these signals is
optional, but if adopted by the parties, their use is restricted
only to medical purposes.75 A flashing blue light was the signal
adopted for the identification of medical aircraft.76 Additional
means of signaling such as a distinct radio message77 and a
secondary surveillance radar system78 are provided in subse-
quent articles. The final decision regarding the allocation of the
radio signals is reserved for the judgment of the International
Telecommunication Union.
Resolutions were adopted at the conference which requested
the International Civil Aviation Organization,7" Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization"0 and Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union" establish the necessary pro-
cedures for implementing the provisions of the Technical
Annex relating to distinctive signals. Once these procedures are
established, the comprehensive scheme envisioned by the draf-
ters will be completed and constitute a much needed addition
to this area."2
73. Annex, Regulations Concerning the Identification, Recognition and Marking of
Medical Personnel, Units of Transports and Civil Defence Personnel, Equipment of
Transports, Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, at 68-75.
74. Id. at 73-74.
75. Id. art. 5, at 73.
76. Id. art. 6.
77. Id. art. 7.
78. Id. art. 8, at 74.
79. Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 46, at 112.
80. Id. at 114.
81. Id. at 116.
82. Article 18 his provides a mechanism for periodic review of the Technical Annex.
This update procedure grants the ICRC the option of convening a conference of experts
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Information of the Victims of a Conflict and Remains of
Deceased
Due largely to initiative shown by the United States, a
unique and important section dealing with those persons miss-
ing in action was adopted during the third session. Undoubt-
edly, the United States experience in Vietnam was the impetus
for this drive. The language of Article 20 bis expresses the
purpose of the new section as follows: "The activities . . . shall
be mainly prompted by the right of families to know the fate
of their relatives." The United States delegation enthusiasti-
cally approved this wording, and predicted that it would estab-
lish a new human right in international law.84
The Protocol establishes a duty on behalf of each party to
the conflict to search for all persons reported missing by an
adverse party. 5 This search must be carried out as soon as the
circumstances permit and not later than the cessation of active
hostilities. The gathering of this information will be required
for all those who have been detained for more than two weeks,
or who died while in detention," and will be controlled by
requirements mandating compliance with the applicable provi-
sions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.8 The pertinent infor-
mation will be transmitted to the adverse party by either the
Protecting Power, Central Tracing Agency of the ICRC, or the
national Red Cross Societies."
Another article dealing with the treatment of persons in the
power of a party to the conflict discloses a similar humanitar-
ian attitude regarding the rights of families. This provision
requires participating parties to facilitate the reunion of dis-
persed families, and especially to encourage the efforts of any
humanitarian organizations engaged in these tasks." The com-
bination of these two articles recognizes the importance of im-
parting information to families separated during a war. As
every four years, or whenever the ICRC believes the Annex would benefit from such a
review. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, at 17.
83. Id. at 19.
84. Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 46, at 8.
85. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 20 ter, at 19.
86. Id. art. 20 ter (1).
87. Id. art. 20 ter (2).
88. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 23, art. 138.
89. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 20 ter (3), at 19.
90. Id. art. 64 bis, at 53.
1977]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
such, it represents an innovation of humanitarian law in this
area.
Closely related to the issue of accounting for persons miss-
ing in action is the respect and maintenance of grave sites for
those who are not nationals of the state in which they die. This
apparently simple problem soon changed into a two-sided pol-
itical issue with the United States on one side and the German
Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union on the other. The
United States was successful in convincing its opponents to
delete a provision which exempted "war criminals" from the
article regulating gravesites. The final wording, however, al-
lows the host state to "regulate the practical arrangements" for
visits to the graves."
Rules were adopted which require that gravesites be re-
spected, maintained and marked pursuant to the applicable
procedures embodied in the Fourth Geneva Convention." As
soon as relations between the parties permit, agreements must
be concluded which will facilitate access to and maintenance
of the gravesites, as well as facilitate the possible return of the
remains of the deceased upon proper request.13
Grave Breaches
An issue of fundamental importance was settled with the
adoption of Article 74 concerning the repression of grave
breaches." This article extends the penal sanctions of the four
Geneva Conventions to draft Protocol 1.11 Under this system
each contracting party has three essential obligations: first,
to enact legislation providing for penal sanctions for persons
committing grave breaches; second, to search for persons al-
leged to have committed grave breaches; and third, to either
try these persons in their own courts, or to deliver them to
another contracting party for trial.9 Therefore, "grave
breaches" are those violations of the Conventions or Protocol
considered to be universal crimes and which are properly pun-
ishable by any contracting party to the Convention.
91. Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 46, at 8.
92. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 20 quater, at 20.
93. Id. art. 20 quater (2).
94. Id. at 60.
95. See arts. 49-52; 50-53; 129-32; 146-49 of the Geneva Conventions, supra note
23.
96. Commentary, supra note 27, at 94.
[Vol. 61:253
HUMANITARIAN LAW
Article 74 incorporates those acts deemed to be grave
breaches under the four Geneva Conventions 7 and, in addition,
defines the following acts under Protocol I as grave breaches:
(a) making the civilian population or individual civil-
ians the object of attack;
(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the ci-
vilian population or civilian objects with the knowledge that
such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians,
or damage to civilian objects, . . .;11
(c) launching an attack against works or installations
containing dangerous forces with the knowledge that such
attack will cause excessive [losses] . . .;11
(d) making non-defended localities and demilitarized
zones the object of attack;
(e) making a person the object of attack with the knowl-
edge that he is hors de combat;
(f) the perfidious use of the Red Cross . . . signs
[and emblems]. '
The overriding issue with respect to the new grave breaches
was which guidelines could be established to distinguish pro-
perly between incidental and intentional violations. The
United States delegation was extremely concerned with any
rules that would incorporate subjective factors into the deter-
mination of whether incidental harm was "disproportionate"
in relation to the military advantage sought.'"1
To a large measure, this problem has been remedied with
the incorporation of language requiring that a grave breach
constitute a "wilful violation." Additional restrictions placed
on combat violations require that the target must have been
the "object of attack"; or the attack must have been executed
"with the knowledge" that the resultant excessive losses would
be suffered."' This does not comprise a precise set of criminal
statutes, but should be sufficient to ensure proof of a high
degree of mens rea for combat violations.
Additional grave breaches were added to Article 74 because
97. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 74(2), at 60.
98. Id. art. 50(2)(a)(iii), at 44 interprets this to mean loss or damage "which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
99. Id.
100. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 74(3), at 61.
101. See generally Solf & Grandison, supra note 32, at 589.
102. Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 46, at 4-5.
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of intense political pressure by some states.' 3 Included are such
offenses as transferring persons in an occupied territory in con-
travention of the Fourth Geneva Convention,' 4 unjustifiable
delay in repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians, practices
of apartheid and other inhuman practices based on racial dis-
crimination, making historic or cultural objects the object of
attack when there is no justification, and depriving a protected
person of a fair trial.' °5 These noncombat grave breaches are
limited in the same general manner as all other grave breaches
in that the particular conduct must be committed wilfully and
in violation of the Protocol or Conventions.' 6 Therefore, the
apartheid breach is limited because the constitutive acts must
also be in violation of some other article of the Conventions or
Protocol.
In conjunction with the repression of grave breaches, the
text of an article dealing with breaches resulting from a failure
to act was adopted. A separate article was thought necessary
to establish this principle because many national penal sys-
tems do not define the failure to act as a criminal offense.'07
Regardless of the problems that will be raised in certain states,
the article requires the contracting parties to repress all grave
breaches, and suppress all other breaches resulting from a fail-
ure to act when under a duty to act.'10
This same article also deals with the problem of a superior's
liability for failing to prevent a subordinate's breach. This rule
establishes responsibility if the superior knew or had informa-
tion from which he should have known that the subordinate
was committing or going to commit a breach, and the superior
did not take all feasible measures to prevent it.' "' This appar-
ently omits the "Yamashita" requirement which states that
the superior must have the power to prevent the breach."' In-
stead, a type of exhaustion of remedies doctrine is now required
of the superior. Making this rule consistent with the differing
military regulations of various states would probably be an
103. Id.
104. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 23, art. 49.
105. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 74(4), at 61-62.
106. Id. at 61.
107. Commentary, supra note 27, at 96.
108. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 76, at 62.
109. Id.
110. Commentary, supra note 27, at 96.
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impossible task. Therefore, the ICRC opted for this wide rang-
ing proposition which ignores specific command chain rules
and their peculiarities.
B. Protocol II - Noninternational Armed Conflicts
Combat Restrictions
The central issue in the question of whether certain combat
restrictions should be placed on the conduct of hostilities in an
internal conflict was not the possible effectiveness of such
rules, but rather the attitude of a majority of the Third World
nations. It has been apparent that these governments have
refused to alter their position that the scope of applicability of
Protocol II should be limited. Their main reason was that they
desired to retain their sovereign prerogative to deal with rebels
as traitors and to punish them accordingly."' Essentially, it
came down to the proposition of whether Protocol II was going
to have any provisions curtailing combat actions.112
Fortunately, the third session was responsible for adopting
the first articles circumscribing the actual conduct of hostilities
in an internal armed conflict. In general, the regulations are
identical to their counterparts in Protocol I.
The general theme, expressed in Article 20, states that the
methods and means of combat are not unlimited."3 This article
proscribed the employment of any means or methods which
would cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering."'
Regulations were adopted which incorporated the principles
of quarter,"- safeguarding an enemy hors de combat,' and
111. See generally J. BOND, supra note 4, at 58-61.
112. At present, only Article Three common to all four of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 applies to internal armed conflicts. See note 3 supra. This provision guarantees
only the minimum degree of humanitarian treatment for civilians and offers no assis-
tance to rebels or insurgents. See 0. UHLER, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVIN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 25-44 (J. Pictet ed. 1958) for a useful
background on Article Three.
113. Draft Protocol II, supra note 27, at 18.
114. Id. The corresponding Article 33 in Draft Protocol I contains a prohibition
against means or methods which could cause widespread, long-term, and severe dam-
age to the natural environment. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, at 31. An identical
regulation is found in Article 28 bis of Draft Protocol II. Draft Protocol II, supra note
27, at 22. See also Cantrell, supra note 32, at 326.
115. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 22, at 19. See discussion of text at note
36 supra.
116. Draft Protocol 11, supra note 27, art. 22 bis, at 19. This version omits the third
paragraph of Article 38 bis in Draft Protocol I which deals with releasing those detained
when safe evacuation is impossible. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, at 33.
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prohibiting the improper use of recognized signs."7 The adop-
tion of these articles indicate that Protocol I will contain the
first international restrictions which are applicable to situa-
tions which heretofore have been governed by domestic law.
Penal Prosecutions
Certain criminal procedural guarantees were adopted for
the benefit of those accused of committing an offense during a
noninternational armed conflict. These regulations bind both
the government and insurgent groups when conducting crimi-
nal proceedings.
The general thrust of the requirements is that all accused
persons are entitled to be tried before a tribunal which offers
"the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality." 118
A minimum of procedural safeguards is then listed, including:
(a) assuring prompt notice to the accused of the
charges, and the rights and means of a defense;
(b) limiting criminal responsibility to that of the indi-
vidual and not incorporating the theory of collective
responsibility;
(c) establishing no criminal responsibility for acts
consistent with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege;
(d) establishing the presumption of innocence for the
accused;
(e) guaranteeing the right to be present at one's trial;
(f) affirming the prohibition against self-
incrimination;" 9
(g) assuring the accused that he would be advised of
the appropriate appeal procedures and time limits.2 '
These guarantees are a combination of the most important
procedural rights to be found in the Third and Fourth Geneva
Conventions, and comprise the essential minimum guarantees
of a fair trial.
In addition to setting forth the various procedural rights of
an accused, Article 10 also limits the application of the death
penalty. It is forbidden to "pronounce" a sentence of death on
117. Draft Protocol II, supra note 27, art. 23, at 19.
118. Id. art. 10(2), at 8.
119. Id. at 8-9.
120. Id. art. 10(3), at 9.
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persons who were below the age of eighteen at the time of the
commission of the offense, and it also is forbidden to "carry
out" the death penalty on pregnant women and mothers of
young children."
Another important limitation on the use of the death pen-
alty is a built-in mitigating factor for those who respect and
obey the regulations of Protocol Il. This mitigation principle
applies to those persons who are prosecuted only for having
taken part in the hostilities. The court is under a duty to con-
sider the accused's respect for the rules of Protocol II when it
decides upon the appropriate sentence. ' This provision was
clearly inserted to encourage combatants to respect all of the
rules of Protocol II.
The death penalty is also forbidden with respect to those
who are prosecuted for merely taking part in the hostilities. In
no case can it be carried out until the end of the hostilities. ',,
This flat prohibition combined with the mitigating principle of
respect supplements the ICRC goal of encouraging a general
grant of amnesty after the cessation of hostilities.' u
Execution of Protocol II
Four articles comprising the entire section dealing with the
observance of the Protocol during armed conflict were adopted
in the third session. The observance of the entire Protocol
would consist of many separate actions taken by a state, in-
cluding the dissemination of the regulations to civilian and
military authorities; the establishment of a medical service;
and the policing of the regulations during a conflict. Because
of the various techniques which could be employed by different
states in this regard, a general dutz of observance was estab-
lished: "Each Party to the conflict shall take the necessary
measures to ensure observance of this Protocol by its military
and civilian agents and persons subject to its control."' '
121. Id. art. 10(4). The prohibition against pronouncing the sentence of death is
based upon the Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 23, art. 68. However, the prohi-
bition against carrying out the sentence against pregnant women and mothers of young
children protects the child (born or unborn) and does not protect the woman. See
Commentary, supra note 27, at 142.
122. Draft Protocol II, supra note 27, art. 10(5), at 9.
123. Id.
124. Article 10(7) states, "At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall
endeavor to grant amnesty to as many as possible of those who had participated in
the armed conflict." Id.
125. Id. at 28.
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Closely associated with the general duty of ensuring observ-
ance is the requirement that the Protocol's rules be dissemi-
nated among the populace. Article 37126 mandates that during
peacetime the High Contracting Parties will disseminate the
Protocol as widely as possible.' 21 When an armed conflict
breaks out, both the present government and insurgent group
must take appropriate measures to disseminate the Protocol
among their "military and civilian agents and persons subject
to their control."'' 28
The drafters included a method of achieving supplementary
protection in internal armed conflicts through the use of special
agreements. Because Protocol ]I offers only fundamental pro-
tection, the ICRC has always encouraged the parties to incor-
porate the wider scheme of humanitarian law applicable in
international armed conflicts. ,29 This provision allows the par-
ties to bring all or part of the 1949 Geneva Convention and
Protocol I into force by means of concluding agreements or
mutual declarations between themselves. 13
0
The final article concerning the execution of Protocol II
allows each party on option to request the services of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross.'"' This optional provision
affirms the traditional role of the ICRC in this area,' 32 but
regrettably omits the original draft's encouragement to the par-
ties to request assistance from any impartial body that could
provide assistance.3 3 Overall, however, this deletion cannot be
considered as crucial to the entire framework of this section.
The fundamental responsibility for ensuring observance of the
126. Id.
127. There was a preliminary objection to peacetime dissemination of the Protocol
because it might encourage insurrection. Fortunately, the ICRC drafters prevailed in
the debate, and the rule remained in the article. See Commentary, supra note 27, at
169.
128. Draft Protocol II, supra note 27, art. 37(2), at 28.
129. This provision was based on common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,
supra note 23, which states, "The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour (sic)
to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions
of the present Convention."
130. Draft Protocol II, supra note 27, art. 38, at 28. The original ICRC plan also
included the proposition that a single party could make a unilateral declaration as to
the wider scheme of protection, but this proposal failed to gain the necessary support.
See Commentary, supra note 27, at 170.
131. Draft Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 39, at 28.
132. This initiative is set forth in common Article 3(2) of the four Geneva Conven-
tions, supra note 23.
133. Commentary, supra note 27, at 170.
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Protocol shall always remain the primary duty of the parties
to the internal armed conflict. Moreover, the application of
humanitarian law in internal hostilities will be governed by the
parties' motivations and desires. Realizing this proposition, the
regulations requiring dissemination of the Protocol to both
sides can be seen as the key achievement of the third session
of the conference and constitute the greatest cause for opti-
mism in this area.
V. CONCLUSION
The adoption of forty-two articles at the third session of the
Diplomatic Conference is an indication that the various delega-
tions have toned down the political rhetoric that was present
in the earlier sessions. Strong political differences between
blocs did (and still do) remain, but their presence was accepted
in a compromising manner which allowed substantial progress
to be made in both protocols. This compromising spirit has
generated an optimistic outlook that the three main commit-
tees and working groups will conclude the forthcoming discus-
sion session on time. Perhaps more importantly, the texts
which were adopted at the fourth session will have undergone
the process of preliminary adoption in an atmosphere of reason
and compromise. This will undoubtedly assure that the final
adoption of the plenary will be accomplished with a minimum
of political interference which could ultimately delay the proto-
cols' final approval.
The position of the Third World bloc nations has remained
the same since the fundamental issue over the status of wars
of liberation was settled by elevating them to the category of
international armed conflicts. Protocol I will now cover these
conflicts, and give them a prima facie legitimacy. The Third
World bloc has considered this elevation of liberation conflicts
to substantially reduce the scope and importance of Protocol
II and civil conflicts. Satisfied with this major victory, the
Third World nations view Protocol II so narrowly as to make it
meaningless. Therefore, the subsequent acceptance and use of
Protocol II in the Third World area cannot be realistically ex-
pected. This is especially disappointing in light of the fact that
the majority of liberation wars will undoubtedly be fought in
the Third World.
Some observers have privately stated that the narrowed
scope of Protocol H will probably allow the majority of develop-
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ing states to formally sign the document. If this is true, then
Protocol H's application will have a narrow scope, but its pro-
tection will at least technically be extended to a few types of
armed conflicts within its perimeter.'34 This occurrence could
be viewed as a small victory by optimistic observers. However,
the drafters' ideals of expanding humanitarian protection to all
civil armed conflicts has fallen woefully short.
At the time of this writing the Fourth Session has con-
cluded, and the Conference will meet in plenary session at
some future time to formally adopt the texts of the Protocols.
The formal signing of the Protocols will supplement the exist-
ing 1949 Geneva Conventions and form an updated and im-
proved text of humanitarian law in armed conflicts. With the
exception of the disappointments of Protocol II and its proba-
ble nonuse, the achievements of the sessions will undoubtedly
be viewed as historic events in the chronicle of humanitarian
law.
134. Specifically, rebels could maintain a type of sporadic control over territory,
instead of having a continuous control, and thus arguably be entitled to the protection
of Protocol II. See Draft Protocol H1, supra note 27, art. 1, at 2-3.
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